Curbing violence in the Niger Delta

EFFORTS by the Nigerian government to restore peace in the Niger Delta region by disarming the militant groups have failed to yield good results. Recently, a peace talk initiated by the Bayelsa State government suffered a setback when militants attacked one of Exxon-Mobil's vessels. The failure of these efforts is attributable to several factors, including the lack of a comprehensive disarmament and demobilization programme that can effectively rehabilitate the militants after they have been disarmed.

To address these shortcomings, the Federal Government of Nigeria, backed by all the state governments in the Niger Delta, should implement a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programme.

In October 2004, a Peace Agreement was signed by the two major militant groups in the region at the time: Dokubo Asari's Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and Tom Ateke's Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV). This Agreement failed for want of a strategic framework to ensure its implementation. No comprehensive plans were made to rehabilitate the ex-militants and as a result, most of them returned very quickly to militant activities.

In interviews granted after the Peace Agreement failed, some of the participants disclosed that some government officials who were responsible for receiving the surrendered arms connived with the major arms suppliers to the militant groups to re-sell the weapons to them. There were also reports that the militants surrendered only the lowest grade of weapons, and withheld their more sophisticated weapons. These accounts, if true, suggest that the disarmament process was doomed from the onset.

The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), which was established to coordinate development programs in the region, has been criticized for not fulfilling its mandate effectively. With the Yar'Adua government exhibiting a new attitude to the crises in the region, and expressing a strong desire to implement the Niger Delta Development Master Plan, perhaps the NDDC will become more effective. There are several NGOs providing various forms of support to Niger Delta indigenes, including vocational training. However, these efforts have failed to reduce conflict in the region because they lack the force of authority to attract the participation of the major players in the conflict.


Disarmament, the first phase of the DDR programme recommended here, will involve the surrender of arms by the militants, and the public destruction of these arms to ensure that they are not re-possessed by militants through connivance with corrupt officials. The second phase is demobilization, under which the structures set up by the militant groups are disbanded, and the members provided with assistance to meet their basic sustenance needs.

To maintain stability in the region, the ex-militants must be economically integrated into the society. Therefore, the third phase, reintegration, involves helping the ex-militants and their families to become active participants in the economic and socio-political structures of their communities. Under this phase, the ex-militants are given financial assistance to start new businesses, vocational training, return to formal education, etc. This phase goes beyond the ex-militants, to the larger community. The government must ensure economic and infrastructural development, institutional reform, greater participation for the Niger Delta indigenes in their governance, and government accountability.

As a necessary complement to government efforts, the relationship between the local communities and oil companies must be redefined. Issues such as environmental pollution and threat to fishing and farmlands require new approaches to ensure that oil companies in the region apply global best practices in their operations. The changes made at these broader levels will determine, to a large extent, the success or failure of any rehabilitation programmes implemented in the region.

Additionally, for the DDR programme to succeed, the indigenes and the militants must "own" it. This means that the indigenes and the militant groups must be involved in its planning and implementation. Only then will the programme be sufficiently "legitimized" in the eyes of the people to gain their acceptance and support.

Perhaps there will always be some measure of conflict in the Niger Delta. However, as Laurie Nathan writes, "States that are stable are not free of conflict. Rather, they are able to deal with its various manifestations in a stable and consensual manner." ("The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: The Structural Violence in Africa.") A well-planned and implemented DDR programme will go a long way in curbing the violence in the Niger Delta region.